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Abstract 
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Machinists at Eastern would begin this struggle on the shop floor and eventually take it to Eastern's 
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period for labor, where unions are battling daily against corporate demands for concessions, IAM District 
100 had the harder task of ending concessions that had already been granted. 
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1AM District 100 
Vs. 
Eastern and the Banks 
by Andrew R. Banks 
The Eastern Air Lines company cafeteria is packed. But those 
waiting in line are not there to eat lunch. The year is 1974 and 
thousands of Eastern's ramp servicers, baggage handlers, and 
mechanics have waited since their shift ended at 3:30 p.m. to vote 
in an election. This is not an election for union recognition (these 
workers have been represented by Machinists District No. 100 since 
1939). It is an election to determine the board of directors of Eastern's 
credit union, which covers all of Eastern's 40,000 employees. 
In previous years the credit union, then worth about $100 million, 
had a board made almost entirely of management employees. The 
International Association of Machinists (LAM) had asked for some 
representation on the board and were turned down. So the union 
decided to run its own slate. The mood is militant. White-collar 
management employees are at the end of the line (their workday 
ends at 4:30 p.m.). The Machinists begin to get rowdy, chanting union 
and anti-management slogans. Management voters are becoming 
increasingly uncomfortable and begin to leave. The IAM wins a solid 
majority of directors' seats. Eastern and its credit union will never 
be the same. 
The new credit union made many changes, but when they 
appointed an aircraft electrician as chief administrator, the entire 
credit union industry became uneasy. Despite the fact that Eastern 
(EAL) itself was on the verge of bankruptcy, they had insisted that 
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the IAM "grease monkeys" didn't have the ability to effectively 
operate such a large financial institution. Over the next nine years, 
the board would make many innovations: steamlining management, 
paying close attention to the investment of credit union assets, and 
offering more services such as low interest loans and free checking. 
The Eastern credit union is now the largest industrial credit union 
in the world, worth nearly half a billion dollars, a 500% increase in 
nine years. Frank Borman, Chairman of the Board and President of 
Eastern Air Lines, claims that the company is still on the brink of 
financial disaster. 
Little did the workers know in 1974 what an important event was 
transpiring when they captured control of their credit union. Lessons 
in administering the credit union would give many rank-and-file 
members—some of whom would become future leaders of the 
union—the wherewithal to challenge management in the operation 
of Eastern Air Lines itself. 
The story that follows is a story of how IAM District 100, step by 
step, escalated a struggle over almost every major issue facing the 
labor movement today: concessions, control of corporate investment 
decisions, the power of the financial industry, management- initiated 
"employee involvement" schemes, workers' education, joint control 
over large corporate pension funds, and union leadership style. 
The Machinists at Eastern would begin this struggle on the shop 
floor and eventually take it to Eastern's stockholders meetings and 
to the boardrooms of the world's largest financial institutions. 
In this bleak period for labor, where unions are battling daily 
against corporate demands for concessions, IAM District 100 had the 
harder task of ending concessions that had already been granted. 
The airline industry is one of the most heavily unionized sectors 
of the U.S. economy. Union-negotiated wages and benefits, 
particularly because of airline regulation, are higher than in other 
industries. But because of the deregulation of airlines in 1978, higher 
fuel costs, a series of deep recessions, and in many cases incompetent 
management, many airlines are in severe financial trouble. The 
predominant-union among airline ground crews is the Machinists 
union. Since airline workers are covered by the Railway Labor Act 
instead of Taft-Hartley, representation is certified company-wide. 
Therefore, airline collective bargaining agreements resemble the 
national contracts of the auto and steel industry in this respect. In 
fact, the Machinists have fought hard to maintain a tradition of an 
"industry standard" contract. The Machinists have insisted that 
industry competition must not take place through a bidding war with 
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airline workers' wages. Even Delta Airlines, the only major non- 1 
union airline, responds to this pressure; it has historically paid its I 
workforce from $1 to $3 per hour above the industry standard. I 
Frank Borman has emerged as the leading industry spokesperson, I 
and Eastern has experimented with some very "innovative" (if I 
inequitable) labor relations practices. In 1981 Borman commissioned I 
a study by Robert Joedicke of Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb for finan- I 
cial community justification of these new practices. The study, The I 
Goose that Laid the Golden Egg: An AMine Industry Monograph, 1 
blamed the workers and their union for the industry's woes and I 
recommended major changes in management's approach to unions. I 
Joedicke's report provided a stunning insight into Borman's labor | 
relations strategy. It called for wage givebacks, introduction of more i 
pay grades, speed-ups, working out of classification, and the 1 
introduction of "employee involvement" programs and profit-sharing I 
schemes. Joedicke suggests that management create an atmosphere I 
of impending doom to extract these concessions. Under the guise I 
of "cooperation for mutual benefit," Joedicke's message hits home I 
w h e n he states "such action has occurred in the past only w h e n i 
individual airlines have been in financial disasters to such a degree i 
that union membership has felt threatened as to its very livelihood." j 
Finally, Joedicke saw a potential danger in a rank-and-file backlash I 
through the election of a more militant leadership. He advised I 
management to tell workers that: 1 
Changing union representation to naive candidates w h o I 
promise unrealistic goals to the rank and file will not change I 
the outcome in the long run since it will be impossible to get 1 
blood out of a s t o n e . . . . j 
As we will see, Joedicke's blueprint for a management strategy of | 
concessions was taken seriously by Eastern's management. | 
Concessions and the Variable Earnings Program 1 
In 1975, amid industry and press acounts of impending bankruptcy | 
for Eastern, all of EAL's unions agreed to a one-year pay freeze and | 
a personnel reduction of about 2,000 employees. This first round of | 
concessions was worth at least $80 million to the company. Eastern [? 
went from declaring a net loss of $95 million in 1975 to a net gain |; 
of $39.1 million in 1976. Eastern, however, was not satisfied with the ? 
concessions it had extracted from its workers. It wanted more, and I) 
developed a strategy to institutionalize substantial givebacks. \i 
i 
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Three years later the union would uncover a confidential 
correspondence to Frank Borman entitled "Wage and Salary Program 
for 1977—and Beyond." William R. Howard, Senior Vice President 
of Industrial Relations, lamented that the "wage freeze was presented 
as a 'one-shot7 program which will die at the end of 1977 unless some 
positive steps are undertaken." The May 7, 1976 memo stated that 
one of the major obstacles to advancing a new program of conces-
sions "will be the recent apparent 'turnaround' of the company, since 
most employees probably see Eastern as less imperiled today than 
a year ago." 
Howard's solution was three-fold. First, a new wage giveback 
program must be presented as a profit-sharing plan. Secondly, 
Eastern must manipulate and present its financial data in a way that 
makes the company appear to be in trouble. Howard suggested that 
Eastern announce its new concessions program in October rather 
than in May because of the cyclical nature of airline profits: 
Any announcement of a new program at about (October) would 
almost certainly follow two months of serious losses and would 
be far more timely then, in my opinion, than any announcement 
at this time, on the heels of four months of excellent profits. 
The third aspect of the new concessions program was to make it 
for a period of five years. 
With some minor changes, Howard's proposal was accepted by the 
company and was labeled the Variable Earnings Program (VEP). The 
LAM agreed to the program for five years to expire July 4, 1982. 
The VEP was sold as a profit-sharing plan. Workers would give 
back 3.5% of their wages each year, and if the company's profits were 
greater than 2% of gross revenues, the workers would receive a 
portion of these profits back. In five years Eastern workers lost over 
$100 million under the VEP. As the LAM points out, this concession 
was worth more than the total value of Eastern's stock. 
The District 100 leadership had sold the VEP very heavily as an 
investment in the company. When the rank and file eventually 
realized that the VEP was not a profit-sharing program but a wage 
concession, they felt betrayed. 
In 1980, the membership elected a new District 100 president, 
Chaiies Bryan. Bryan's central campaign promise was to end the VEP 
and concessionary bargaining. Essential to this effort would be 
Bryan's belief that the union must have the expertise to analyze and 
expose misleading company financial data and unrealistic profit-
sharing schemes. 
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The company h a d found it easier to extract concessions from 
Bryan's predecessor and immediately proceeded to "teach the un ion 
a lesson." The first skirmish in what would become a protracted war 
occurred dur ing Bryan's first week in office. The company decided 
to strictly enforce a coffee break policy in its maintenance shops in 
Nuami. Traditionally, workers would take their 15-minute break w h e n 
a job was completed and w h e n lines were small in the break room. 
Now management demanded that all of the h u n d r e d s of Miami base 
shop workers take their break at the same t ime. W h e n workers 
waiting in long lines for coffee were told to go back to work, they 
refused to do so until they received their coffee. The company t h e n 
fired one 62-year-old worker for "spilling water" o n a supervisor a n d 
deducted 12 minutes of pay from h u n d r e d s of paychecks. 
Bryan felt the company was trying to force a wildcat strike. They 
would then picture the new union leadership as "crazy militants." 
Instead, Bryan went on a public campaign decrying Eastern's tactics 
as those of Mart in Ludwig Bormann's scorched ear th policy. Union 
members began wearing but tons demanding the company "Free the 
EAL Hostages," a n d the un ion issued bulletins a n d press releases 
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contending that "EAL USES IRAN'S TACTICS." This public embar-
rassment at the time that the U.S. Embassy in Iran was seized proved 
to be too much for Eastern. All pay deductions were returned to the 
workers, all disciplined workers were fully reinstated, and all 
previous break privileges were restored. Both sides had learned a 
lot about each other. EAL learned it would take a lot to get Bryan 
to overreact. Bryan learned the company would try almost anything 
to discredit the union, but that it also was very vulnerable to public 
scrutiny. 
tension Fund Research 
Eastern administers and completely controls its employees' pension 
funds. Although these funds are legally the deferred wages of Eastern 
workers, the IAM, like most industrial unions, never bothered to seek 
control. The Machinists' fund at Eastern is currently worth over $160 
million, and all pension funds at Eastern are valued at well over $1 
billion. 
In 1979 Marty Urra, editor of IAM Lodge 702's newspaper, attended 
a seminar at Florida International University's Center for Labor 
Research Studies. Urra was shocked to learn that the pension funds, 
the investments of which were largely controlled by banks and 
insurance companies, were being used to undermine the very jobs 
of those workers who legally owned them. U.S. workers' pension 
funds, which represent the largest pool of investment capital in the 
world, are financing the move of multi-national corporations overseas 
and to the non-union South. Urra was also to learn how these funds 
were being manipulated and that most had historically returned less 
on their investments than the passbook savings accounts at local 
saving and loan institutions. In this seminar Urra learned of growing 
union interest in gaining a role in the investment and control of 
workers' pension funds. 
The seminar also taught how the smaller but jointly controlled 
pension funds of building trades unions were making higher returns, 
increasing benefits, giving low interest rates on members' home 
mortgages, and investing in projects that put unemployed members 
to work. Lastly, Urra learned how to use public documents such as 
the U.S. Labor Department's 5500 form to decipher exactly what was 
going on in his own pension fund. He discovered how an analysis 
of these documents can give unions important insights, not only 
about pension funds but also a company's entire financial operation. 
At the time Charles Bryan won his election in January 1980, Marty 
Urra became president of Local Lodge 702 in Miami. Lodge 702 is 
^.j^^aife^^ 
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the largest local in District 100 and accounts for approximately one-
half of the District's 13,500 Eastern membership. As 702 president, 
Urra began to investigate Eastern's pension fund. He found that the 
fund was returning very little on investments and that company 
figures distorted the company's contributions. 
Later, during negotiations in 1982, the company was eager to point 
out that the average Eastern worker had $1.19 per hour paid into the 
pension fund and that the industry standard for Machinist classifica-
tions was only $1.08 per hour. To the company's surprise, the union 
had discovered that while the "average" company contribution may 
have been $1.19 per hour at EAL, it was only because pilots received 
$4.86 per hour while the Machinists received only $.71. Thus, the 
union explained, if the company was willing to contribute the 
industry standard, Machinists at EAL would receive a 32% increase. 
Charles Bryan appointed Urra to head a pension research com-
mittee and hired union consultant and pension expert Randy Barber 
to look into deeper issues. 
One of the things the committee discovered was that by hiring an 
actuary who would unilaterally change the pension funds invest-
ment return assumption, EAL could save millions of dollars in 
pension fund contributions. As the AFL-CIO Industrial Union 
Department's Labor & Investments reports: 
Eastern raised its interest assumption from 7% to 9% in 1981. 
The company's pension contributions were consequently 
reduced by over $20 million for that and each subsequent 
year "With the stoke of a pen," says Marty Urra, President 
of IAM Local Lodge 702 in Miami, "the company saved millions 
of dollars on its pension contributions. But we negotiate the 
benefits on the basis of the company's costs under the 7% 
assumption. Eastern simply manipulated our pension fund for 
its own purposes, and our members received no benefit what-
soever from this action." 
The last straw came when the union's pension fund research 
discovered that Prudential Life Insurance Company, which manages 
the Eastern funds, financed the construction of the National Right-
to-Work Committee Building in Virginia (built non-union, of course); 
and that Eastern had "reallocated" assets from several of its funds, 
including the Machinists', into several others, including the pilots'. 
With this information, the union embarked on a series of infor-
mational meetings throughout the country (IAM District 100 
represents Eastern workers in more than 50 cities). Out of these 
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meetings, the union, with the assistance of Randy Barber, decided 
to include in the union's bargaining package a demand for joint con-
trol over the EAL pension fund. Included in the union's demand 
for joint control were proposals for arbitration, joint selection of a 
fund manager, an assistant manager hired by the union trustees, and 
joint selection of an actuary. Beyond this, the union asked that 25% 
of all new contributions to the fund be earmarked for consumer loans 
for participants and that the funds provide for optional retirement 
housing for members. 
Because of the information meetings and the union's active involve-
ment in pension research, District 100 was able to develop what is 
likely to become standard language for union control over single 
employer pension funds. Moreover, because of the members' involve-
ment at all stages of the committee's investigation, this issue would 
take a prominent place on the District's priority list in negotiations. 
Contract Negotiations: The Opening Salvos* 
One of the major differences between the Railway Labor Act (RLA) 
and the National Labor Relations Act is in the area of the negotia-
tion process. Under RLA, if the parties have not reached agreement 
by the expiration date of the current contract, they are prohibited 
from taking economic sanctions such as strikes or lockouts until a 
series of mediation and cooling-off periods expire. This whole process 
usually takes a year or more after contract expiration. During this 
period, the old contract is in effect except for the "time certain" 
provisions—those clauses in the contract that designate specif ic dates 
(other than the expiration date) for specific things to happen. For 
example, in the District 100/Eastern agreement, "time certain" clauses 
include scheduled pay increases and the end of the VEP on July 4, 
1982. The expiration date of the contract was December 31,1981. This 
had two major impacts: 
First, unless agreed to otherwise in a new contract, the VEP payroll 
deduction would take place after the December expiration date up 
to July of 1982. Secondly, Machinists would not receive a pay increase 
until new increases were bargained under the new contract/Tradi-
tionally, under the Railway Labor Act, labor and management have 
agreed to retroactive pay increases to cover some or all of the lengthy 
period of time that negotiations take place after the contract expires. 
In the Fall of 1981, when negotiations began for the new contract, 
the District negotiating team made it very clear that the union would 
not agree to a contract that contained the VEP or other wage con-
cession programs. The company knew it had a real fight on its hands 
and prepared accordingly. 
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The company's plan was to repeat its previous strategy for gaining 
wage freezes and the VEP. 
When the union announced that VEP would end, the company 
knew its only chance of continuing wage concessions was to win 
over the hearts and minds of the IAM membership. To do this, 
Eastern management felt it must isolate the union leadership from 
the workers and campaign on the shop floor for the members' loyalty. 
In min-1981, management announced a voluntary "employee 
involvement" program for its workers. Called Quality Circles, the 
program encouraged small groups of workers to meet once a week 
under the leadership of their supervisor ostensibly to discuss ways 
of improving productivity. 
After the program was in place for about a month, many of the 
shop stewards started to complain that the Quality Circles were being 
used to convince workers to bypass the union grievance procedure 
and take complaints to Circle meetings. Representatives of the 
Combined Shop Committee in Lodge 702 approached the Center for 
Labor Research and Studies (CLR&S) at Florida International Univer-
sity with questions about employee involvement programs. They 
knew that workers' sincere desire to have decision-making input on 
the job could be manipulated by the company's Quality Circles. 
The CLR&S conducted two training programs on what workers 
and unions should look for in legitimate employee involvement pro-
grams. The first training program was for the approximately 200 shop 
stewards of the Combined Shop Committee. The second training 
program was for Lodge 702's general membership. The seminars 
discussed the strong and weak points of such quality of worklife 
programs and showed that historically in the U.S., many of these 
programs have been initiated by companies to separate workers' 
loyalties from their unions and, in fact, to weaken the labor 
movement. 
Out of these seminars, District 100 established a Quality of Worklife 
Bargaining Committee and notified Eastern that the circles would 
cease until the union and the company bargained worker participa-
tion at all levels of company decision making. 
After sending representatives to the University of Michigan's 
Summer School for Workplace Democracy in August of 1981, the 
committee included in its bargaining package strong language on 
a worker participation program. 
The contract proposal called for equal union/management 
representation on a steering committee that would have the power 
to consider all of the workers' ideas. It also called for no layoffs or 
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station relocations of any IAM member due to any program 
emanating from Quality Circles, for jointly selected outside con-
sultants, and for a 50-50 sharing of all cost savings achieved by the 
circles. This money was not to be distributed to individual workers, 
but would be deposited in a trust fund, administered by the IAM, 
to provide supplemental benefits to "all IAM members equally 
whether Circle members or not." 
Needless to say, the company would not agree to the IAM proposal 
and the Quality Circes were dropped. It's important to note here that 
the union accomplished four important things. 
First, as in the pension research, the union involved the leader-
ship, the membership, and outside experts in the formulation of a 
bona fide worker participation program. This was accomplished 
primarily through the education program. 
Secondly, by proposing an alternative to Eastern's Quality Circles 
that addressed more directly the members' desires to have a say on 
the job, the union was able to prevent Eastern from claiming that 
it was the company that was truly concerned about the workers' feel-
ings, not the old-fashioned, obstructionist union leadership. 
Third, the union, because of overwhelming support by the member-
ship, was able to prevent the company from using these Quality Circle 
groups as a base of support for more concessions in the new contract. 
Finally, (and probably most important) through the wide discus-
sion which took place in the IAM about the whole issue of worker 
participation, coupled with the union's proven success at running 
the credit union, the rank and file began to feel that they had both 
a right and an ability to be involved in decision-making at all levels 
of the company. Thus, Charles Bryan concluded in a Quality Circle 
bulletin to the rank and file: 
A recent gesture from Eastern Air Lines' Board of Directors to reject \ 
our participation on the Board of Directors (in their "Quality Circle" 
at the highest level) leads to serious doubt of the company's sincerity j 
to truly achieve the ultimate success in a "Quality Circles Program." 
At this point the union realized that the best weapon it had to end j 
concessions at Eastern was the ability to research the VEP and \ 
Eastern's recent financial performance. Moreover, this research must I 
take on the same form as the District's previous efforts on the pension f 
and quality-of-worklife issues. All levels of the union must be j 
involved, aided by expert consultants who would understand the f 
union's philosophy, and the end product of the investigation would j 
be a series of membership education and information meetings. f 
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Marty Urra was appointed to head the District's Corporate Research 
Committee. Since the VEP was tied to Eastern's health, it was 
important for the IAM to investigate if Eastern's management was 
manipulating the company's financial profile so that it would not 
have to proclaim "doom and gloom" in order to continue wage 
concessions in the new contract. 
The District hired financial researchers Steve Abrecht and Mike 
Locker of Corporate Data Exchange as consultants on the investiga-
tion. Abrecht and Locker had established a national reputation as 
corporate researchers during the J.P. Stevens campaign and for their 
subsequent publications of profiles of the ownership structure of U.S. 
corporations. The Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union 
had hired them to work on the corporate profile of Stevens and to 
expose its interlocking relationships with other corporations and the 
financial community. 
The consultants and the Research Committee would find some 
very useful information about Eastern Air Lines, the VEP, and 
Eastern's relationship to the financial community. 
The VEP agreement provided that Eastern workers would only be 
paid back their yearly VEP contribution if Eastern's profits reached 
2% of gross revenues. In 1976, when the VEP was being "sold" to 
Eastern workers, 2% seemed a very reasonable profit level for a 
company to need. After all, if in these inflationary times Eastern 
couldn't make a 2% profit, then maybe the company really needed 
the VEP giveback. The union Research Committee found out, 
however, that profit levels are not normally determined by percent 
of gross revenue. The standard method of reporting profits is stated 
in terms of a company's return on investment or its annual percentage 
growth in profits over the previous years. And through its research, 
the union found that historically a 2% return of gross revenues was 
quite high for the airline industry. 
The company had led the union to believe that the "2% of gross 
revenue" interpretation of profits represented the minimum level of 
profits the company needed in order to stay afloat. Thus, the union 
had been hoodwinked into accepting a definition of profit that was 
not a real indication of Eastern's health. As mentioned above, 
Eastern's workers lost more than $100 million in wages as a result 
of their acceptance of the company's financial doubletalk. 
When the union exposed this through bulletins and information 
meetings, the IAM members coined a new word to describe the 
company's habit of manipulating financial jargon to extract 
concessions: Bormanomics. 
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The Productivity Myth 
On a regular basis, through correspondence to workers and 
numerous interviews in the press, Frank Borman would lament 
Eastern's performance against its chief competitor, non-union Delta 
Air Lines. Delta was generally considered the healthiest of all airlines. 
Borman focused on Delta's non-union status as a reason for its 
superior performance. In a message to company employees in March 
1981, Borman complained: 
Delta's people are more productive than ours mainly because 
of less restrictive work rides I am aware that many Eastern 
employees are tired of comparisons with Delta. I am tired of 
it too. But only a fool ignores his competition. 
The union's Corporate Research Committee, not wanting to be 
fools, researched how Eastern compared with its competition. The 
results were devastating for Borman's claims. The committee found 
that Eastern was the most productive major airline. Based on figures 
that airlines must report to the Civil Aeronautics Board, the union 
found that: 
• Of the world's top 25 airlines in 1979, Eastern ranked No. 
1 in number of passengers carried. 
• During 1979, Eastern carried 6.6 million more passengers 
than United with 98 fewer airplanes. 
• Employees per aircraft in the same period showed Eastern 
best in productivity in comparison with the top 4 
passenger carriers. No. 1 Eastern had 154 employees per 
aircraft versus No. 4 Delta with 178 employees per aircraft. 
• On time performance, Eastern had ranked three rankings 
ahead of Delta in 1976, 1977, 1978, and 1979. 
• Eastern's total operating expense was $1.6 million per air-
craft lower than Delta's in 1979. 
• A chart of the International Air Transport Association 
(IAIA) described the "IAEA's Most Productive Airlines— 
1979." Eastern ranked No. 1 with 1,106 passenger boardings 
per employee. 
Armed with this information, the District published the results in 
bulletins and conducted information meetings about the high worker 
productivity. Again, the union was able to successfully discredit the 
company's interpretation of its financial condition. Out of the 
•*••"'* •%"- v . 
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information meetings, the rank and file began to ask the committee 
what would prove to be a critical question: "If Eastern is doing so 
well in all of these categories, what is happening to our money and 
why aren't we getting a return on our 3.5% VEP giveback?" 
Responding to the members' request, the District decided to look 
into this question. 
Eastern and the Bankers 
When Locker and Abrecht finished their initial investigation of 
Eastern, they conducted a two-day training program for the Research 
Committee and Bryan. Out of this training program, a collectively 
produced corporate profile began to emerge. Even though Eastern 
showed a profit from 1976 through 1979, the company declared 
dramatic deficits in 1980, 1981, and 1982. The definition of profits 
wasn't important any more—there weren't any. Now the members 
and the Research Committee wanted to understand how Eastern 
could be so productive and yet lose so much money. 
When comparing Eastern to its major competitor, Delta, there was 
one startling difference which could account for Eastern's troubles. 
Eastern had the highest debt of any airline in the U.S. In 1981, 
Eastern's debt was $1.7 billion compared to Delta's $282 million. 
Money that could have gone to pay back the VEP was instead 
diverted to Eastern's creditors. 
Eastern had borrowed money to "modernize its fleet." Between 1978 
and 1981 Eastern had taken delivery on 77 new aircraft. The union 
interpreted this to mean that Eastern was on a "fast-track buying 
spree" in order not to show a profit and to make employees feel the 
need to extend the VEP concessions in the new contract. Another 
question came up now: If Eastern was in such bad shape, why were 
the banks loaning it money? What was Eastern's relationship to the 
banking industry? 
In compiling Eastern's profile, Locker and Abrecht discovered that 
Eastern's Board of Directors was literally saturated with repre-
sentatives of the banking and finance industry. Nine of the sixteen 
full directors and four of the seven advisory directors were all linked 
to banking and finance interests. The most important and powerful 
committees were totally dominated by the financial community. All 
eight Executive Committee members, three of the six audit Commit-
tee members, and four of five Finance Committee members had ties 
with the financial community. Of particular interest was that the 
Rockefeller family (Chase Manhattan Bank) had significant repre-
sentation with Peter O. Crisp and Laurence S. Rockefeller. Moreover, 
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Banking & Financial Interests 
Represented on Eastern's Board 
Name Financial Institution '_ 
Harry Hood Bassett 
Peter O. Crisp 
James A. Elkins Jr. 
Karl Eller 
William Wood Prince 
Donald Rumsfeld 
Edward Smith 
Thomas R. Williams 
Frank Borman 
Roswell Gilpatric 
Laurence Rockefeller 
E. Smythe Gambrell 
Paul E. Reinhold 
Chrm, Southeast Bank Corp 
Rockefeller Family & Assoc 
(Chase Manhattan Bank) 
CEO, 1st City Bkcorp TX 
Dir, Arizona Bank 
Dir, First Chicago Corp 
Dir, Allstate Insurance 
Former Chrm, 1st Atlanta 
Chrm, 1st Atlanta 
Dir, Southeast Bank Corp 
Ptnr, Cravath Swaine & Moore 
(Gnl Cnsl, Chemical Bank) 
Rockefeller Family & Assoc 
(Chase Manhattan Bank) 
Ptnr, Gambrell & Russell 
(atty, 1st Atlanta Corp) 
Former dir, Barnett Banks 
/ / / / / 
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X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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Source: Locker/Abrecht Associates, Inc. 
President and Chairman of the Board, Frank Borman, was a director 
of Southeast Bank Corp., while Southeast Bank Corp. Chairman 
Harry Hood Bassett was a director of Eastern. To the union, the 
picture was becoming increasingly clear as to why the banks were 
so willing to lend money to Eastern: potential profits could be 
diverted from stockholders to lenders (Eastern's common stock has 
not paid a dividend since 1969!). The company's workers had donated 
over $100 million of their salaries to the banks in the form of interest 
payments on Eastern's debt. 
This raised another question: How does Eastern's accelerated pur-
chase of new aircraft fit into a scenario of bank control? There was 
no question that Eastern's "modernization" program was unique in 
the airline industry. The Research Committee discovered that in 1978, 
the company had projected that it would purchase 26 new aircraft 
over five years when, in fact, they ended up purchasing 64. What 
is even more amazing is that Eastern adjusted its aircraft purchases 
upwards while the economy was taking a nosedive, interest rates 
were skyrocketing, and passenger travel was at rock bottom. The 
union came to the conclusion that not only was it ethically wrong 
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for a company to create a climate of fear of impending disaster among 
workers in order to extract concessions to purchase aircraft which 
were unnecessary; it was also a bad management decision to make 
that large number of purchases. 
In short, the union and its consultants could not understand why 
Eastern management was working against Eastern's own interests. 
The answer came when the union looked at the corporate structure 
of Boeing Aircraft, which manufactured the new B-757 jetliner. 
Because of recession and a worldwide glut of inexpensive used 
aircraft, Boeing was in deep financial trouble. It was Boeing manage-
ment's hope that their new B-757 and B-767 would bail the company 
out. On the other hand, it was becoming increasingly clear to 
Boeing's major lenders that if Boeing defaulted on its huge debt, 
many of the world's major financial institutions would suffer severely. 
It was imperative for Boeing and its lenders to have the 757 and 767 
program become a financial success. 
When the union discovered this, it also found some interesting 
links between Boeing's and Eastern's lenders. Incredibly, both Boeing 
and Eastern shared the same two lead lenders, Citibank and Chase 
Manhattan Bank. Not only did these lead banks hold significant 
Common Major Lenders to Eastern & Boeing 
E B CL 
Citibank 
Bank of America 
Chase Manhattan 
Morgan Guaranty 
Chemical Bank 
Manufacturers Hanover 
Bank of Montreal 
Bankers Trust 
Continental Illinois 
First National Bank of Chicago 
Security Pacific National Bank, L.A. 
Irving Trust 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Marine Midland Bank 
Mellon Bank 
Crocket National Bank 
Seattle First National Bank 
Pacific National Bank of Washington 
X 
X 
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X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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E—Eastern Lender B—Boeing Lender CL—Common Lender 
Sources: The Iron Triangle, Gordon Adams, Council on Economic Priorities, 1981; 
Locker/Abrecht Associates, 1983. 
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amounts of debt in Eastern and Boeing, they also packaged and 
marketed the loans for the 757 program for both Boeing and Eastern. 
The union discovered that of Boeing's top eighteen lenders, twelve 
were also shared with Eastern. 
This explained everything to the union. From this time forward, 
Charles Bryan would base his negotiation strategy on the assump-
tion that major financial decisions at Eastern were being made in 
the best interests of the lenders and Boeing, interests which may 
indeed conflict with the best interests of Eastern, its workers, and 
its stockholders. Bryan also understood that success would depend 
upon the credibility of the union's financial interpretation to the 
membership, other Eastern unions, the business press, and impor-
tant segments of the financial community. 
Borman constantly complained to Bryan that the union must agree 
to new concessions or the lenders would cut off Eastern's access to 
credit. The company even invited the Research Committee and 
Locker and Abrecht to meet with its major creditors in New York 
in order to have pressure put on Bryan directly from the lenders. 
At the meeting one creditor told Bryan that the IAM better agree 
to concessions because Boeing was already building Eastern's planes 
in Seattle and that those planes needed to be paid for. 
Instead of bowing to the lenders' pressure, the union based its 
bargaining strategy on the principle that the banks would not let 
Eastern go under. The union felt that the financial community would 
have too much to lose: Boeing would have difficulty paying its debt 
if Eastern's orders were cancelled and the lenders could not afford 
for Eastern to default on such a large debt. 
Taking it to the Top 
District 100's membership information meetings began to generate 
an incredible amount of discussion and support among Eastern's 
workers. The Executive Board of the flight attendants' union, 
Transportation Workers Union Local 553, asked to be included in a 
second training program conducted by the consultants for District 
100's negotiating committee. 
The company reacted harshly to this challenge of what was 
previously their exclusive terrain—the interpretation of company 
financial health and exclusive control over economic decision-making. 
Eastern pursued an aggressive campaign to dissuade its employees 
from accepting District 100's contentions. On any given day 
employees could expect to find letters from Borman, video tape 
appeals on the shop floor, and lengthy articles in the company news-
letter and the Miami Herald. 
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Publicly Eastern denied what was obvious to the workers; Bryan 
and the Machinists' were raising important questions about the 
company and the rank and file was becoming increasingly mistrustful 
of the company and more militant in their support of the union. The 
company, however, claimed that the union was not in touch with 
the membership. As contract talks deadlocked over the VEP issue, 
the union felt it should make a strong show of membership solidarity. 
On April 8,1982, the rank and file showed their solidarity. For two 
weeks supervisors had been puzzled by IAM members sporting but-
tons which read "Lunch with the Bunch" printed over the face of 
a clock reading 11:30. At 11:30 a.m. on April 8th, virtually all of the 
3,000 Machinists on shift at Miami downed their tools and took to 
the streets. Another 1,000 IAM members from other shifts met them 
at the gate. They marched along Miami's busy 36th Street. Hand-
made picket signs decried their distrust of Borman, the VEP, and 
the bankers. Signs read: "Borman: Bankers' Pal," "I earn 96.5% of 
my Wings Every Day," "Earth to Frank—No More VEP" and "If VEP 
Hies, EAL Won't." 
This was the largest labor demonstration in memory in Miami. The 
media went wild. The company would find it difficult, from this time 
forward, to convince anyone that the membership of the IAM 
supported its position. This demonstration of support also convinced 
President Bryan that his philosophy of involving the rank and file 
at all levels was correct. In a few weeks the rank and file would be 
involved again, this time at a much higher level. 
Consistent with his belief that workers must have input at all levels 
of the corporation, Bryan made many attempts to communicate 
directly with stockholders and EAL's Board of Directors. At the annual 
stockholders' meeting in 1980 and 1981, Bryan had placed his own 
name in nomination for a director's position on EAL's board. It was 
never Bryan's assumption that he would be elected, but he wanted 
to take the Machinists' fight to the arena in which the most critical 
decisions affecting Eastern workers were made. Thousands of 
Machinists, flight attendants, and even pilots sent in their proxies 
to vote for Bryan. In 1981 Bryan received 480,000 votes for director. 
At the 1981 meeting, Bryan challenged Borman from the floor, listing 
25 areas of corporate decision-making in which Bryan felt the 
company needed to give the workers and shareholders some straight 
answers. His last question was indicative of the concerns of the IAM 
members: 
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You [Borman] frequently quote history. Certainly you made 
history with Apollo 8. Why do you ignore the history lesson 
the British learned regarding 'taxation without representation/ 
by continuing to ask our employees to give, contribute, and 
sacrifice, but "don't get involved at the top"? 
The business press would pick up on many of Bryan's questions 
and for the next two years would ask questions critical of EAL's 
management practices. Eastern's opposition to Bryan's election to the 
Board of Directors demonstrated to the workers, the media, and the 
public the contradictions in EAL's statements which blamed the 
workers for the company's financial woes. The union would claim 
the company couldn't have its cake and eat it too. How could Eastern 
demand worker concessions because of a financially troubled 
company on the one hand and refuse to let those same workers have 
the power to influence corporate decision-making on the other hand? 
At the April 27, 1982, EAL stockholders' meeting Bryan decided 
to try a different tack from the previous two years. The massive lunch-
hour demonstration two weeks earlier in Miami—combined with the 
knowledge the rank and file had obtained through union bulletins, 
education meetings, and a sometimes critical press—convinced the 
District that the rank and file should be heard at the 1982 
stockholders' meeting. 
More than 200 graveyard shift workers from Kennedy, LaGuardia, 
and Newark airports trekked across Long Island and New Jersey to 
attend the meeting at the Chemical Bank Building in lower Manhat-
tan. Before the meeting began, these Machinists picketed outside 
demanding an end to "concession fever." UAW members from 
General Motors' Linden, New Jersey plant pulled up to take the 
Machinists' place on the picket line. 
Ironically enough, on the same day as the lunch hour walkout 
several weeks before, the Linden auto workers attracted national 
attention when they overwhelmingly voted down proposed conces-
sions at GM. While watching themselves on the evening news, they 
also saw the demonstration in Miami. One thing led to another, and 
here they were picketing EAL in a show of solidarity in the fight to 
end concessions. 
Inside, Machinist after Machinist rose to ask serious and sometimes 
embarrassing questions about Eastern's management practices, and 
charge that Eastern's lenders were controlling the corporation for their 
own ends. Two days later in a bulletin to all District 100 members, 
Charles Bryan summed up the recent events: 
26 UP AGAINST the GLOOM and DOOM! 
Eastern Air Lines employees had contributed.. .as of this 
date.. .approximately $110 million. For the third year in a row, 
Eastern Air Lines officially rejected my nomination to the Board 
of Directors as a spokesman for the interests of the 
employees... All sixteen (16) members of the Eastern Board of 
Directors are affiliated with banks and other institutions of the 
Super Rich. Eastern's position has demonstrated absolute con-
tempt and disrespect for the employees and their right to 
representation in the decision-making and yet Eastern con-
tinues to ask the employees to sacrifice and contribute their 
salaries to the company treasury. 
In 1776, our forefathers had a revolution against the King of 
England over this same issue. 
The Death of VEP 
As the July termination date of the VEP approached and contract 
negotiations dragged on, both the union and management stepped 
up their respective campaigns. 
The company brought out the video tape machines and Borman 
pressed the LAM membership to continue the VEP, maintaining that 
it would help the company much more than the Machinists who 
would only have to sacrifice a few six-packs of beer each paycheck. 
In another bulletin to District 100 members, President Bryan 
expressed the members' shock at Borman's perception of their 
spending habits: 
I have been deluged with calls from LAM members expressing 
indignation with the repeated reference to "3 or 4 six-packs of 
beer".. .Most of our members could not relate to that drinking 
habit reference. They felt a reference to a pair of shoes or slacks 
or dresses for their children each week would have been better 
understood. 
Some felt the VEP would cover their inflated electric bills each 
month; others suggested it would cover their weekly auto 
gasoline bill. 
We regret that we do not have equal time on the video tape 
machine with you as a captive audience. However, the con-
tinued solidarity and unity of our membership is an inspiring 
source of strength. 
Within days, thousands of IAM members were wearing buttons 
picturing a can of beer labeled "Frank's 3.5 Beer." The button protested 
"Deposit, No Return." 
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When the July 4th date passed and workers still found the 3.5% 
VEP deduction on their pay slips, Eastern's last bit of credibility 
among the workers vanished. As morale dropped, so did the effi-
cient operation of the company. Even though the Federal mediator 
had not "released" the parties, in a record turnout, District 100 
members voted on whether to strike over what Bryan labeled as the 
company's "VEP treachery." On August 9, 1982, the final tally was 
94.8% in favor of a strike. 
Because of a possible strike by September, Eastern passenger book-
ings were low. The company finally gave in and started to negotiate 
the end of VEP. 
Knowing that the company would claim the union to be 
unreasonable and that much more needed to be negotiated before 
a complete contract could be settled, the District negotiating team 
proposed a unique end to the VEP. First of all, the program in which 
workers risked their wages on the possibility of future company 
profits was ended. For a two year period (until June 1984) the workers 
would still have 3.5% of their wages deducted, but in the form of 
a loan which the company must pay back at a favorable 10% interest 
rate. Even though the I AM would have preferred no program what-
soever, this new Investment Bonus Agreement (IBA) guaranteed an 
end to concessions at Eastern. 
But though the VEP issue was settled in a satisfactory manner to 
most Machinists, management was pressing for new concessions in 
the contract negotiations. 
Fight for a Contract 
By January of 1983, the company began its final offensive to get 
concessions in the new contract. The union claimed that would-be 
profits were being diverted to the bankers in order to bail out Boeing. 
In a press release, Bryan claimed: "The balance sheet of Eastern is 
in a chronic economic crisis as a result of an extremist, fast-track 
expansion program. This desperate pace has to be toned down. 
Borman must start treating his employees and their money with the 
same priority and respect that the bankers and insurance companies 
demand." 
In the final weeks of negotiations, the company again tried to 
discredit the union's claims. But the company found that Bryan's 
years of open communication with the members and the media had 
paid off. Bryan had insisted throughout his battles with Eastern that 
as a responsible union leader with a credible analysis of Eastern's 
finances, the company's board of directors, major lenders, and the 
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business community at large must seriously respond to the union's 
position. The Wall Street Journal and Business Week, as well as other 
business publication, had published numerous articles which 
basically supported the union's analysis. Even the local media in 
Miami, which has always been very kind to the city's largest 
employer, was constantly pressing the entire business community 
to counter the IAM's charges. 
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Finally, in a desperate attempt to win back some of the credibility 
it had lost, the company invited the union to meet with the leading 
lenders and it gave the union's consultants access to information that 
was not publicly available. Because of the union's constant public 
accusations that Eastern was keeping a double set of books—one set 
for the lenders and another for the public—the company made 
available documents which union consultants Locker and Abrecht 
claimed are "considered highly sensitive by all corporations." Wendy 
Cooper, a New York based financial writer, reported in the New York 
Times that an Eastern spokesman admitted that the company gave 
the union access to this secret information "in response to its constant 
charges that the company keeps two sets of books." 
Locker/Abrecht Associates issued a report on March 11,1983. Their 
report disclosed some very significant information: 
• In a financial presentation to Eastern lenders, Eastern had 
projected a substantial profit of $128.8 million by the end 
of 1983. Moreover, documents showed that Eastern was 
currently ahead of these projections by $6.4 million. If fuel 
prices continued to fall, Eastern could realistically expect 
an additional savings which was not figured into its profit 
projections. 
• Lenders' documents verified the union's previous suspi-
cions about Eastern's accelerated purchase of new aircraft. 
The new aircraft would produce a larger cash flow than 
aircraft which Eastern already owned. Lenders were 
interested in cash flow rather than profits because cash 
flow is the determining factor in Eastern's ability to pay 
its tremendous debt. 
• Confidential minutes of the Board of Directors confirmed 
that Boeing's financial health was important to Eastern's 
directors. In July 1981 and March 1982 while con-
templating a deferral of new planes on order because of 
the deepening recession, it was decided that Eastern 
should go ahead with the purchases. Locker and Abrecht 
discovered in the Board minutes that a "factor which 
seems to have influenced the Board in its decision.. .was 
an apparent concern about the impact that a deferral of 
757 purchases would have on Boeing's entire program for 
that aircraft." 
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• Moreover, the consultants found that, while EAL was 
purchasing new planes at breakneck speed, much of its 
existing fleet was underutilized. "At a company-estimated 
value of $13 million each,.. .equipment worth $195 million 
will be parked by year end." 
Armed with this new information, Bryan felt that the union had 
sufficient "empirical data that would support our position and prove 
that we would not bankrupt the airline." In the following weeks, the 
company and the union conducted a virtual war with facts and 
figures. 
The Federal mediator released the parties and a strike deadline 
was set for March 13. In the last minutes, the company gave their 
"final offer." The union negotiating team termed the offer a "joke," 
but under the LAM's constitution, a new vote had to be taken on 
the final offer and the strike deadline was moved back to March 23rd. 
The company used this extension to attempt to persuade IAM 
members that the company's final offer was good. And, in case that 
didn't work, Borman also tried a little intimidation. In a letter sent 
to workers' homes, Borman declared that "I cannot guarantee your 
jobs if this contract is rejected," and he said that if there were a strike, 
the company would operate the airline without the Machinists. 
Similar to how Eastern had defined profit under the VEP, the 
company was now describing its final offer as a 32% pay increase 
over three years. In fact, because of the way the final offer backloaded 
large percentage increases in the final two months of the contract, 
accumulative "rate" of pay may have been 32.2%, but the Machinists 
would receive only a 8.3% pay increase for three years, an average 
yearly increase of 2.8%. This meant that Eastern's IAM members 
would lose from $6,000 to $10,000 for that period compared to other 
contracts in the airline industry. 
Also included in the company's final offer was language which 
would decrease job security, allow the use of part-timers, and change 
very important work rules. The company was so confident that it 
would win the vote, it provided buses for free rides to the strike vote 
meeting. In a bulletin to the members, President Bryan summarized 
the situation: 
For the past seven years, you have lived under the threats and 
intimidations of bankruptcy or a scaled-down airline with 
massive layoffs. Management has now come out of the closet 
with their union-busting advice of how to resign from the union 
and their threats to hire strike-breakers. 
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The decision you must now make is whether you have had 
enough of a management who has demonstrated that their 
desire to break the union has a much higher priority than the 
financial success of Eastern Air Lines. 
A YES vote for the company package is a vote to continue 
working in constant fear designed to wrench wage concessions 
from you forever. 
The decision is yours. With strength and solidarity and a NO 
vote against this company offer, we will prevail. 
On Saturday, March 19th, the ballots were counted. The IAM 
membership had voted by a 3 to 1 margin to reject the "final" offer „ 
and to strike on Wednesday evening, March 23. Bryan offered to 
resume talks in Washington, and the company responded by saying 
Frontloading 
"Backloading" a contract grants the bulk of wage increases toward the end 
of the contract, while "frontloading" provides the bulk of pay raises toward the 
beginning. Eastern Airlines (EAL) proposed a "backloaded" contract while the 
actual settlement was more "frontloaded". 
Both provided for the hourly wage at the end of the contract to be approx-
imately .32% higher than that paid at the beginning. But over the life of the 
contract, the workers would have received a $6,8&7 increase under the EAL 
Dates 
i Jan. 1, 82-
March 31, 83 
April 1, 83-
Oct. 31, 83 
j Nov. 1, 83-
March 31, 84 
April 1, 84-
Oct. 31, 84 
Nov. 1, 84-
Dec. 31, 84 
3 year total without 
£41 PROPOSAL 
Number 
of Months 
15 
7 
5 
7 
2 
36 
Monthly 
Salary 
$ 2,279.33 
2/116.09 
2,561.06 
2,714.72 
3,013.34 
ncrease.. .$82,050.00/Proposed 
Total 
$ 34,189.95 
16,912.63 
12,805.30 
19,003.04 
6,026.68 
88,937.60 
increase.. .$6,887.60 
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they would send their negotiators to listen. Prior to the strike vote, 
the company had insisted publicly that "if they can't accept the 
contract, they're on strike." 
The Settlement 
Eastern's absenteeism rate dropped dramatically on the first shift 
of March 24,1983. Workers were anxious to let their supervisors know 
how happy they were that, according to one ramp service worker, 
"management caved in." 
It is 11 a.m. Concourse B at Miami International Airport is packed 
with workers wearing bright yellow and blue EAL uniforms. Some 
had been scavenging through waste cans, looking for tossed away 
buttons management employees had worn all week stating "I love 
my job. Thanks Eastern." As one group of workers handed out the 
discarded buttons, another group went around taping over the word 
vs. Backloading 
proposal but will receive a $14,346 increase under the actual settlement. 
EAL proposed three 6% increases, to take effect on April 1, 1983, November 
1,1983, and April 1,1984. The actual settlement provided for a 20.99% increase 
retroactive to January 1,1983, a 2.14% increase on July 1,1983, a 3.38% increase 
on January 1, 1984 and a 3.57% increase on July 1, 1984 
The following table demonstrates the better deal gained by the workers under 
the actual settlement as compared to the EAL proposal. 
Dates 
Jan. 1, 82-
Dec. 31, 82 
Jan. 1, 83 
June 30, 83 
July 1, 83-
Dec. 31, 83 
Jan. 1, 84-
June 30, 84 
July 1, 84-
Dec. 31, 84 
3 year total without 
EAL/1AM Settlement 
Number 
of Months 
12 
6 
6 
6 
6 
36 
Monthly 
Salary 
$ 2,279.33 
2,757.73 
2,816.67 
2,912.00 
3,016.00 
increase...$82,050.00/Actual 
Total 
$ 27,351.96 
16,546.38 
16,900.02 
17,472.00 
18,096.00 
$96,366.36 
ncrease.. .$14,31636 
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"Eastern" with the name "Charlie." 
Charles Bryan's plane was due at 11 o'clock but was delayed until 
noon. Workers weren't worried that their break period was over. This 
was their day. A young night shift Machinist had been waiting for 
Bryan's arrival since 9 o'clock. He brought his wife and small children 
to meet the president of his union. 
Bryan and the negotiating team arrived at the far end of the 
concourse. Bryan thanked the members for their support. As he 
walked down the long concourse, a sea of yellow and blue follow-
ed. It was his day too. 
The previous evening, only a few hours before the strike deadline, 
Eastern had agreed to change their "final" offer. The agreement was 
significantly different. 
The new contract called for an industry standard increase of more 
than 17% over three years; a 21% retroactive increase to January 1, 
1983; equal control over any future worker participation programs; 
partial joint control over the pension fund; increased job security 
rights; and the integrity of long-standing work rules. 
On April 9, the IAM announced that the contract had been ratified 
with a vote of 90%. Frank Borman proclaimed, "This settlement could 
only be characterized as a rape." • 
